Numerous papers have tried to explain cognitive biases, such as optimism and overconfidence, from an evolutionary perspective. The attempts have met with mixed success. I identify why some approaches are more successful than others in explaining sub-optimal behaviours. I conclude that some evolutionary explanations of cognitive biases can be successful; the relevant explanation will depend on the particular bias being studied. In particular, I highlight the need to incorporate internal costs when considering the evolution of mental mechanisms, and how this can provide adaptive explanations of sub-optimal behaviours.
Introduction and definitions
Since Kahneman and Tversky pioneered the study of biases in cognitive processes (e.g., [1] ), the topic has been of great interest to psychologists and, more recently, behavioural ecologists. Table 1 supplies various definitions of the term 'cognitive bias'. The common theme is of a bias (or distortion) to a cognitive process or mental representation. A cognitive bias could result in optimal behaviour (i.e., behaviour that maximises expected payoff, often measured simply in terms of surviving offspring) according to some definitions but not others. These differences have led to confusion, discussed below. An additional layer of complexity emerges in lab experiments when an individual behaves according to adaptively evolved responses, but could increase rewards if the lab setting was understood by the subject.
In recent studies of non-human species, 'cognitive bias' has been used very generally, to mean decisions that are influenced by emotions [2] [3] [4] , even if the consequent behaviours are optimal. This can be confusing, as a bias is arguably from something, and it is not always clear under this definition what a bias is from (functionally).
Raghubir and Ranjan [5] identify several stages at which apparent cognitive biases could arise, including: perception, memory-retrieval, information integration, making a judgement, and behaviour. Neuroscience is generally not yet able to directly identify distorted cognitive representations at a mechanistic level (though progress is being made; [6 ,7,8] ), so identification of a cognitive bias requires inference from behaviour (e.g., [9 ] ). Note that the behaviour could simply be self-reporting of beliefs (although it is easy to mistakenly infer biases such as overconfidence from such reports [10]).
Many behaviours that initially appear irrational can be understood by taking background expectations and subsequent data into account from the perspective of the individual, as it is the expected payoff that determines whether a behaviour is optimal (rather than individual stochastic outcomes). The behavioural sciences have made great strides by using this 'optimality approach' to understand the distribution and timing of behaviours; for example, the marginal value theorem [11], drift-diffusion modelling [12] . However, not all behaviours are optimal; cognitive limitations mean that individuals will sometimes display sub-optimal cognitive biases even in their natural habitats. These behaviours are more challenging to explain from a theoretical perspective.
By dealing with sub-optimal behaviour in the natural habitat, I avoid the semantic subtleties of defining cognitive bias.
1 Such behaviours violate 'ecological rationality' [13] and, depending on interpretation, 'B-rationality ' [14] . Rather than frequentist biases within a population (e.g., due to disorders [6 ,15,16 ] ) or individual differences [17], I focus on the more difficult topic of cognitive biases at the species level. These may sometimes be understood at a holistic level by taking account of not only the behaviours themselves, but the mechanisms that would be necessary for alternative (or 'better') behaviours to be supported.
I first discuss apparent 'explanations' that are flawed.
Attempted explanations that do not address biased behaviours
Various papers have attempted to explain sub-optimal cognitive biases from an evolutionary perspective.
